The high speed train control system is a typical hybrid system, which not only contains a continuous evolution process (train position and speed), but also the discrete event between subsystems. Although some formal methods like HUML, HA and DL have already been used in modeling and verification train control systems, they are not good at describing communication behaviors which are in the interactive process of subsystems. To overcome this problem, we introduce a formal modeling and verification method for hybrid systems. First, we use HCSP to model the behavior of the system. Second, we transit the HCSP models to HA models by introducing some transition rules. Finally we input these HA models to PHAVer which is a tool for verifying safety properties of hybrid systems to automatic verification. Based on the simulation and analysis of a Movement Authority scenario in high speed train control system specifications, the method is proven to be validated.
Introduction
The high speed train control system is a typical hybrid system, which not only contains a continuous evolution process (such as train position and speed process), but also the discrete event between subsystems (some communication behaviors). Some formal methods have already been used in researching the hybrid property of train control systems. Kirsten proposes a formal language of a hybrid system based on UML 2.0 and a layered structure formal model has been analyzed in the railway crossing [2, 3] . OCL (object constraint language) is introduced to HUML by Ziemann and Gogolla and a reasonable train dynamic behavior model is described using HUML in the BART railway line train control system [4] . Platzer first introduced DL which contains a discrete and differential behavior programming verification in formal modeling and verification train control system [5] [6] [7] . Based on the tool Keymera, the ETCS-3 specification is proven to be collision avoidance. An automatic hierarchical design framework has been given by Damm et al. [8] and, based on HA, the cooperation protocol in a train control system is proved to be collision avoidance [9] .
Referring to the above formal methods, HUML is good at modeling the train control system, but the verification is a hard problem. Although HA and DL have already been successfully used in modeling and verification train control systems, they are not good at describing communication behavior in the interactive process of subsystems. To overcome this problem, we introduce a formal modeling and verification method for a train control system. First, we use the HCSP (Hybrid Communication Sequential Process) [10] to model the behavior of the system and then we transit the HCSP model to the HA model by introducing some transition rules. Finally we input these HA models into PHAVer [11] which is a tool for automatically verifying safety properties. Based on the simulation and analysis of a Movement Authority scenario in high speed train control system specifications, the method is proven to be validated.
Model transition

Assumption
In HCSP, some sequential processes like communication and assignment consume time. We give the following two assumptions:
(1) The assignment process does not consume any time (the time consumed in the assignment process is far less than the time transits in a real physical process) (2) The communication synchronization process does not consume any time, but the latency time between communications also exists. In order to automatically verify the property of the HCSP model, we transit the HCSP models to the HA models by introducing some rules. Hybrid automaton fragment: a hybrid automaton fragment HAfrag is a tuple   0   ( , , ,  ,  , where: 
Definition
? ch x is willing to accept a message from the channel ch and assigns it to a variable x, which could be discrete or continuous. 
where:
p || q is a parallel process which behaves as if two processes are working independently except that all communications along channel ch between p and q to be synchronized. An additional terminating location V done is introduced. Action transitions from the components are interleaved, apart from the synchronization of matching send and receive actions, in which they are executed simultaneously. 
Description
According to the general technical programme of CTCS-3 level train control system in railways for passengers [13] , the moving authority scenario is divided into three parts: Arrival-departure Route Scenario, Through-Route Scenario and Block Section Scenario. In this paper, we mainly focus on the Block Section Scenario. As is described in figure 3 , the trains are running on the railway line which is made up of several Block Sections. We assume that all the Block Sections have their length and limited speed. Balise are layout on each Block Section in order to adjust the position of the train. The sketch map of MA scenario.
The interaction between subsystems
The data flow in the Block Section Scenario is shown in figure 4 . The state of each Block Section is sent from TCC to RBC. The onboard equipment sends its position to RBC. Three types of Moving Authority (SMA UEM CEM) will be replied to the onboard equipment which contains the state of Block Section, the speed and the route information. A distance to go curve is computed to supervise the safe running of a train.  If the position of train is between the stop point of CEM and minimal brake point, the emergency brake command must be trigged immediately.  If the position of train is between the minimal brake point and maximal brake point, the service brake command must be trigged immediately.  Once the position of the train exceeds the EOA of CEM, the CEM message must be ignored.
The HCSP model
Model
The HCSP model of the scenario is defined by six parallel processes as follows:
The process is as follows:
(1) Plant The Plant is defined as a recursive process Pr p oc . We assume that the dynamic behavior of train expresses by the continuous process:
where s is the position, v is the speed and a is the acceleration with both initial value are zero. The train stays in number i Block Section in the beginning. Once it enters or leaves a Block Section, it will send synchronization enter or leave message to TCC. 
The Balise process is defined as a sequential process Pr b oc. The position of Balise is a constant value d. When it receives a synchronization message press from Plant, it will immediately send its position to EVC. 
The EVC process is defined as a recursive sequential process Pr e oc. It describes as: When it receives message v from Plant, it will update its position pos:=pos+vT, which may be interrupted by a more priority message S from Balise. When it receives the MA message (eoa,vr) from RBC, it will compute the distance between eoa and de, the target speed and the permit speed. 
Model transition and verification
Model transition
According to the former transition rules, the continuous and discrete variables are unchanged whereas the definition of the channel will be renamed. Using the above transition rules in section 2, we transit the HCSP model to HA model as in Table 1 . 
press Press Then we put the HA model into PHAVer. For example, the input language of Plant automaton is described as: 
Verification
According to the reachability analysis strategies in PHAVer, we give the following forbidden states: (1) Normal MA supervision
Conclusion
The high speed train control system is a typical hybrid system, in which it not only contains the continuous evolution process (train position and speed), but also the discrete event between subsystems. According to the hybrid characteristics of a high speed train control system, a formal modeling and verification method is introduced. The behavior of a train control system is described by HCSP. The HCSP models are transited into HA models by introducing some transition rules in order to verify the hybrid property of a train control system. The HA models are automatically verified by a model checking tool PHAVer. The Moving Authority Scenario is taken as a case study and a Movement Authority Scenario HCSP model is built. The Movement Authority Scenario HCSP model is transited into HA model by the above transition rules. Different MA supervision states which must not be reachable are verified using PHAVer. Based on the simulation and analysis of the Movement Authority Scenario in a high speed train control system specification, the method is proven to be validated.
